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Autonomy, Incentives, and School Performance:  
Evidence from the 2009 Autonomous  
Private High School Policy in Korea† 
By YOONSOO PARK* 
Improving the quality of school education is one of the key policy 
concerns in Korea. This paper examines whether providing schools 
with adequate autonomy and incentives can meet the policy goals by 
looking at a recent policy reform in Korea. In 2009, the Korean 
government granted autonomy to certain private high schools on the 
condition that no financial subsidies would be provided to the schools. 
Because the autonomous private high schools cannot receive a subsidy, 
they have a strong incentive to meet parental demands because 
schools failing to meet these demands will lose students and will have 
to close. Applying the value-added model to longitudinal data at the 
student level, I find that students entering these autonomous schools 
show faster growth in their academic achievement than their peers in 
traditional non-autonomous schools. These results suggest that 
providing schools with autonomy and incentives can be a useful policy 
tool for improving school education. 
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  I. Introduction 
 
mproving the quality of education is one of the key policy concerns in Korea. A 
traditional approach is to provide more resources to schools, though there is 
growing evidence that such an input-oriented policy is not an effective means of 
improving school education. One explanation of the failure of such input-oriented 
policies is that they often fail to provide schools with adequate autonomy and
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incentives to use their resources efficiently and thus improve their educational 
output. For example, Barrera-Osorio et al. (2009) found that providing schools with 
autonomy has become a popular educational reform in both developed and 
developing countries in recent years. Hanushek (2003) reviewed many education 
policies around the world and concluded that creating incentives is much more 
effective than simply increasing inputs to schools. 
This paper investigates whether, and to what extent, providing schools with 
adequate autonomy and incentives improves the quality of education by looking at 
a recent policy reform in Korea, referred to here as the autonomous private high 
school policy of 2009. Traditionally, private high schools in Korea have been 
heavily subsidized and regulated by the government. For example, private schools 
cannot select their own students, cannot charge higher tuitions than public schools, 
and must follow the uniform national curriculum. In exchange for these 
regulations, any financial deficits in the operating costs of private schools are fully 
refunded by the government. Perhaps naturally, some commentators argue that 
private schools have little incentive to improve their teaching technology and make 
efforts to meet parental demands given the strong governmental control and 
support (Kim and Lee 2003). 
To provide better incentives to private high schools, the Korean government 
introduced a new type of school, termed the “autonomous private high school”, in 
2009. As the name suggests, these schools are characterized by a certain level of 
autonomy in school management in the absence of financial subsidies from the 
government. Because they receive no governmental subsidies, they have a strong 
financial incentive to meet parental demands, as schools failing to do so will lose 
pupils and will likely to close. Thus, one may consider the introduction of these 
autonomous schools as an opportunity to investigate whether, and to what extent, 
providing schools with autonomy and incentives -can induce them to improve the 
quality of their education. 
To understand how autonomy and related incentives affect school performance, I 
compare academic achievement levels in three subjects (Korean, math, and 
English) of students attending autonomous schools with that of their peers who 
attend traditional non-autonomous schools using the value-added model suggested 
by Todd and Wolpin (2007). The results show that students at autonomous schools 
tend to show more rapid growth in academic achievement than their peers at 
traditional non-autonomous schools in all three subjects. To assess whether the 
estimated gap in achievement growth is spuriously driven by non-school 
educational inputs such as private tutoring, I include the amount of private tutoring 
expenditures as an additional control variable. In addition, in order to check 
whether the estimated autonomous school premium is spuriously driven by the 
unobserved pre-determined academic quality of the students, I also perform a 
falsification test using pre-determined test scores as (falsified) dependent variables. 
The results suggest that the estimated gap in achievement growth is mainly 
attributable to the type of school the students attend and not by private tutoring 
expenditures or the unobserved pre-determined quality of the students for Korean 
and math subjects. However, the parallel results for the subject of English suggest 
that the estimated gap in achievement growth may not reflect a causal impact. 
These results provide valuable but tentative evidence indicating that providing 
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adequate incentives and autonomy to schools may be a useful policy tool for 
improving school education. 
 
II. Institutional Background and Related Literature 
 
A. Autonomous Private High School Policy 
 
Since the 1970s, most high schools in Korea have been heavily regulated and 
subsidized by the government. The high school equalization policy of 1974 
required that virtually all high schools in large cities, either private or public, 
follow a set of governmental rules which outlined nearly all aspects of their 
operation. For example, all high schools under the equalization policy must follow 
a uniform national curriculum, cannot select their own students, must charge tuition 
amounts set by the government, and must recruit teachers and principals certified 
by the government. Given that the equalization policy mandated private schools to 
charge an equal amount of tuition - to that of public schools, any deficits in the 
operating costs of private schools were fully refunded by the government. 
Consequently, private schools became nearly “public” in their operation, and this 
raised serious concerns about the lack of diversity and incentives in school 
education (e.g., Kim and Lee 2003). 
In an attempt to diversify school education and spur competition among schools, 
the Korean government introduced the autonomous private high school policy in 
2009. In this policy, autonomous private high schools are granted a greater degree 
of autonomy in their operation compared to traditional non-autonomous high 
schools. Essentially, these schools have substantial autonomy in many aspects of 
school management, including student/teacher/principal recruitment, tuition 
amounts, curriculum, textbooks, and academic terms (i.e., their choice of semester, 
trimester, or quarter systems). However, in order to enjoy this autonomy, the 
schools must bear the following responsibilities. First, autonomous schools cannot 
receive any financial subsidies from the government. Thus, they have a strong 
incentive to meet parental demand because schools failing to enroll enough 
students will not be able to finance their operations and will thus have to close. 
Second, they cannot charge more than three times the tuition of traditional non-
autonomous schools. Third, they must reserve at least 20 percent of their places for 
students from low-income families. Fourth, they are allowed to select their own 
students, but not through entrance exams or interviews about academic knowledge. 
Instead, autonomous schools may select their students according to middle school 
grades, (non-academic) interviews, recommendation letters, and a lottery system. 
Particularly, the autonomous schools in Seoul in 2013, which constitute the main 
subject of this study, select their students in a lottery among applicants whose 
middle school grades are above the 50th percentile within their middle schools. 
Finally, the licenses of the autonomous schools must be re-evaluated by the local 
government (i.e., the education superintendent) every five years. If the schools do 
not pass this evaluation, they are converted to traditional non-autonomous schools. 
Between 2009 and 2011, the Korean government designated 49 autonomous 
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private high schools, mostly from existing traditional non-autonomous schools 
across the nation. More than half (25 out of 49) of the autonomous schools operate 
in Seoul, and the present study focuses on these. Since the introduction of 
autonomous schools, however, there has been heated debate as to whether the 
autonomous private high school policy should be maintained. Advocates of the 
policy argue that it can improve the overall quality of school education by spurring 
competition among schools. In contrast, opponents emphasize that autonomous 
schools can deteriorate the educational equity by providing better educational 
services only to those who can afford higher tuition levels of the autonomous 
schools. Particularly, as candidates pledging to abolish autonomous schools were 
elected in many cities and provinces in the 2014 local education superintendent 
elections,1 the conflict between advocates and opponents became even more 
serious. These conflicts garnered media headlines and were followed by a series of 
lawsuits involving parents, autonomous schools, local education superintendents, 
and the central government (i.e., the Ministry of Education). 
 
B. Empirical Studies of Autonomous Private High School 
 
In spite of the heated debate, surprisingly little is known about how autonomous 
schools affect the educational performance of students. Kim and Namkung (2014) 
evaluated the impact of autonomous private high schools on the academic 
achievement of their students. They compared the educational performance of 
students in autonomous schools with that of their peers in traditional non-
autonomous schools after controlling for students’ family backgrounds. They 
conclude that there is a large gap in academic achievement (with standard 
deviations of approximately 0.6~0.7 and 0.7~1.0 for reading and math, 
respectively) between the two types of schools. However, given that autonomous 
schools select students based on their middle school grades, recommendations, 
interviews and related factors, there may be unobserved differences in students’ 
pre-determined academic quality levels that are not captured by their family 
backgrounds. In this respect, the estimated autonomous school premium reported 
by Kim and Namkung (2014) is likely to be overestimated. 
Lee and Shin (2014) attempt to evaluate the spillover effect of autonomous 
schools. Specifically, they estimate how the designation of autonomous schools 
affects the academic achievement of the incumbent students in these schools (i.e., 
students entering the autonomous schools before the designation) and the 
incumbent students in the closest non-autonomous schools (i.e., students entering 
neighboring non-autonomous schools before the designation). They found that the 
designation of an autonomous school does not affect the academic achievement of 
incumbent students within the schools, whereas itnegatively affected the academic 
achievement of students in neighboring non-autonomous schools. 
This study contributes to the literature by examining how autonomous schools 
affect the academic achievement of students. Although understanding whether and 
 
1Out of 17 local education superintendent elections, candidates pledging to shut down autonomous schools 
won 13 elections, including that in Seoul. The exceptions were Daegu, Ulsan, Daejeon, and Gyungbuk. 
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to what extent autonomous schools can improve the academic achievement of 
students would be the first step towards an evaluation of the desirability of the 
policy, there is surprisingly little evidence on this issue. Kim and Namkung (2014) 
reported a large impact, but their estimates are likely to be upwardly biased. Lee 
and Shin (2014) analyzed the spillover effect of autonomous schools but not the 
direct effect (i.e., how they affect students who enrolled in them after the 
designation), which constitutes the main objective of this study. 
 
III. Data 
 
My empirical analysis relies on the Seoul Education Longitudinal Study of 2010 
(SELS 2010). SELS 2010 has tracked three cohorts (students in the fourth, seventh, 
and tenth grades as of 2010) of pupils in Seoul annually since 2010. Table 1 
summarizes the survey timings of SELS 2010. 
Among the three cohort samples, I use the seventh-grade sample in this study. As 
shown in Table 1, students in the seventh-grade sample were surveyed from the 
seventh grade (i.e., their first year of middle school) to the eleventh grade (i.e., their 
second year of high school). This allows an estimation of the effect of attending an 
autonomous private high school on academic achievement after controlling for pre-
determined achievement as measured during the middle school years. 
I restrict my estimation sample to students who entered either autonomous 
private high schools or traditional non-autonomous high schools. Students who 
entered vocational and special-purpose high schools are excluded from the 
estimation sample because these schools are considerably different from 
autonomous and non-autonomous schools in many aspects of school operation 
other than incentives. 
For outcome variables, I consider test scores in Korean (reading), math, and 
English. The test scores were originally recorded on a scale of 100. I standardize 
these scores by subtracting the means and dividing by the standard deviations, with 
the results used as outcome variables. 
Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics of my sample. The table clearly 
shows that students in autonomous schools tend to perform better than their peers 
in traditional non-autonomous schools. The achievement gap between the two 
groups ranges from approximately 0.7 to 1.0 in terms of the standard deviation in 
both the tenth and eleventh grades. However, it should be noted that students at 
autonomous high schools had outperformed their peers in traditional non-
autonomous high schools before entering their high schools. Table 2 clearly shows 
that the students at autonomous high school had already scored higher than their  
 
TABLE 1—SURVEY YEARS OF THE SEOUL EDUCATIONAL LONGITUDINAL STUDY 2010 (SELS 2010) 
School level Elementary School Middle School High School 
Cohort sample Grade 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 
Fourth-grader sample 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014     
Seventh-grader sample    2010 2011 2012 2013 2014  
Tenth-grader sample       2010 2011 2012 
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TABLE 2—SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Autonomous Non-autonomous N  Mean S.D.   N    Mean     S.D. 
Eleventh-grade test score (Z score)       
Korean 264 0.66  0.94  1990 -0.04 0.96 
Math 264 0.80  1.19   1989 -0.09 0.91 
English 263 0.82  1.02   1988 -0.09 0.93 
Tenth-grade test score (Z score)       
Korean 262 0.71  0.86   1968 -0.05 0.97 
Math 264 0.92  0.89   1964 -0.08 0.94 
English 263 0.88  0.84   1969 -0.09 0.94 
Ninth-grade test score (Z score)       
Korean 270 0.59  0.90   2002 0.08 0.96 
Math 269 0.82  0.83   1995 0.08 0.98 
English 270 0.72  0.79   2005 0.10 0.95 
Eighth-grade test score (Z score)       
Korean 270 0.56  0.81   2009 0.05 0.97 
Math 270 0.84  0.87   2009 0.08 0.96 
English 270 0.71  0.81   2009 0.08 0.94 
Seventh-grade test score (Z score)       
Korean 270 0.52  0.86   2001 0.06 0.96 
Math 270 0.77  0.84   1997 0.08 0.94 
English 269 0.73  0.80   1999 0.07 0.94 
Female (yes=1) 270 0.22  0.41   2007 0.50 0.50 
Disabled (yes=1) 268 0.02  0.14   2005 0.04 0.19 
Number of siblings 270 2.08  0.41   2000 2.14 0.52 
First-born (yes=1) 269 0.10  0.30   1988 0.12 0.33 
Single parent (yes=1) 270 0.05  0.21   2008 0.09 0.29 
Father’s education (yes=1)       
Less than high school 270 0.01  0.09   1935 0.03 0.16 
Some college 270 0.10  0.30   1935 0.13 0.34 
College graduate 270 0.51  0.50   1935 0.44 0.50 
Graduate school or more 270 0.21  0.41   1935 0.11 0.31 
Mother’s education (yes=1)        
Less than high school 268 0.02  0.14   1977 0.03 0.16 
Some college 268 0.15  0.36   1977 0.16 0.37 
College graduate 268 0.47  0.50   1977 0.34 0.47 
Graduate school or more 268 0.10  0.30   1977 0.04 0.18 
Father’s age (yes=1)       
49 or younger 267 0.04  0.20   1931 0.06 0.23 
60 or older 267 0.12  0.33   1931 0.12 0.33 
Mother’s age (yes=1)       
49 or younger 269 0.23  0.42   1986 0.23 0.42 
60 or older 269 0.03  0.18   1986 0.04 0.20 
Parents’ employment (yes=1)       
Only mother employed 269 0.05  0.22   2001 0.07 0.26 
Both employed 269 0.44  0.50   2001 0.52 0.50 
Neither employed 269 0.00  0.00   2001 0.01 0.08 
Parental income (10,000 KRW/month) 270 586.02  421.76   2009 497.53 522.05 
Parental income missing (yes=1) 270 0.02  0.15   2009 0.04 0.20 
Male-only school (yes=1) 270 0.71  0.46   2009 0.31 0.46 
Female-only school (yes=1) 270 0.12  0.32   2009 0.34 0.48 
Private school (yes=1) 270 1.00  0.00   2009 0.65 0.48 
Eleventh-grade private tutoring (10,000 KRW/month)       
Korean  234 12.00  24.29   1745 6.25 11.52 
Math  246 34.38  29.48   1814 22.38 23.25 
English  245 26.22  38.64   1803 18.16 22.41 
Tenth-grade private tutoring (10,000 KRW/month)        
Korean  221 9.63  26.02   1635 6.47 11.36 
Math  255 33.04  30.75   1855 22.56 23.49 
English  242 25.69  30.74   1814 20.00 23.02 
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non-autonomous high school counterparts by about 0.6 ~ 0.9 standard deviations 
during their middle school years (i.e., their seventh, eighth, and ninth grades). 
In terms of student characteristics, the proportion of female students is 
substantially lower in the autonomous schools (22%) than in the traditional non- 
autonomous schools (50%). This is largely because most of the autonomous schools 
in Seoul are male-only schools. Among the 25 autonomous schools operating in 
Seoul in 2013, 17 are male-only schools, five schools are co-educational, and only 
three schools are female-only schools. To account for this difference in gender 
composition between the autonomous schools and the non-autonomous schools, I 
control for gender and for the gender composition of the schools (i.e., male-only, 
female-only, and co-educational) in my regression analysis. In terms of family 
characteristics, students in the autonomous schools report higher parental income 
and educational attainment levels than their peers in traditional non-autonomous 
schools. Additionally, students in autonomous schools outspend their counterparts 
in traditional non-autonomous schools on private tutoring. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
 
A. Identification Issue 
 
Ideally, the causal effect of attendance at an autonomous school on student 
outcomes could easily be identified if admissions to autonomous schools were 
randomly determined. In fact, in 2013, the autonomous schools in Seoul admitted 
students by lottery. This indicates that, among the participants in the applicant 
lottery, admissions to the autonomous schools were randomly assigned. However, 
whether a student applied for entry into an autonomous school was clearly non-
randomly determined. In 2013, only top 50 percent of students in terms of their 
middle school grades were able to apply for entry into an autonomous school. In 
addition, autonomous schools charged two to three times the tuition of non-
autonomous regular high schools. These facts suggest that the identification of a 
causal effect of attending an autonomous school depends on how much one can 
control for middle school grades and the parental income of students as well as 
their preferences for an autonomous school. 
 
B. Empirical Model 
 
To address these concerns, I attempt to identify the autonomous school premium 
by controlling for ninth-grade (i.e., the third year of middle school) test scores of 
students along with other background characteristics that are likely to be correlated 
with their application decisions. Specifically, I estimate the following “value-
added” model: 
 
(1) , , ,10 0 1 2 , , ,9 ,9 3 4 , , ,10i m s th s i m s th i th s m i m s thY Autonomy Y X W               
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In equation (1), , , ,10i m s thY  indicates the tenth-grade (i.e., first year in high school) 
test scores of student i in high school s who graduated from middle school m. 
sAutonomy  is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if high school s is an 
autonomous school and 0 otherwise (i.e., a traditional non-autonomous school) as 
of the year 2013.2 , , ,9i m s thY  represents the ninth-grade (i.e., third year in middle 
school) test scores of student i. The lagged test scores are intended to capture the 
minimum required condition to apply for entry into an autonomous school (i.e., the 
top 50% in terms of middle school grades) and the difference in the pre-determined 
academic quality of students between the autonomous and the non-autonomous 
schools. ,9i thX  refers to the baseline characteristics of student i measured in the 
ninth grade when the student decided upon the high schools to which he would 
apply. Specifically, ,9i thX  includes variables on student characteristics (gender, 
disability, birth order) and family background (parental age, parental education, 
parental employment status, parental income, number of siblings, single parent). 
m represents middle school fixed effects, capturing any unobservable 
heterogeneity that students from the same middle schools have in common. In 
Seoul, nearly all students graduating from their elementary schools are assigned to 
their neighborhood middle schools. This suggests that m  will also contain a 
substantial amount of information on the students’ residential locations. sW  refers 
to the characteristics of high school s, such as the gender composition (co-
educational, male-only, female-only) and the establishment type (private or public). 
Given that autonomous schools are all private and mostly single-sex schools, 
controlling for these characteristics is particularly important for distinguishing the 
effect of school autonomy. Finally, , , ,10i m s th  is an error term. 
 
C. Estimation Results 
 
I begin by estimating equation (1) with OLS, clustering standard errors at the 
middle school level. Table 3 shows the estimation results when the Korean, math, 
and English test scores are used as outcome variables. Column (1) of Table 3 shows 
the simple regression results without any covariate, which basically compares the 
average test scores of autonomous school students with those of non-autonomous 
school students. On average, students in autonomous schools achieve higher test 
scores than their peers in traditional non-autonomous schools by about 0.76, 1.00, 
and 0.97 standard deviations in Korean, math, and English, respectively. In column 
(2), I include student characteristics (gender, disability, first-born child), family 
characteristics (number of siblings, single parent, parental age, parental education, 
parental employment status, and parental income), high school characteristics 
(gender composition, establishment type), and dummies for the middle schools 
from which the students graduated (i.e., middle school fixed effects) as control  
 
2Because all students in my estimation sample graduated from their middle schools in February of 2013 and 
entered their high schools in March of 2013, the year 2013 corresponds to the first year they were in high school. 
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TABLE 3—ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR THE TENTH-GRADE (FIRST YEAR IN HIGH SCHOOL) TEST SCORES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Covariates None Student, family, 
school 
characteristics 
(2) + 9th grade 
test scores 
Same as (3) (4) + private 
tutoring 
expenditures 
 A. Korean test scores 
Autonomous 0.760*** 0.688*** 0.393*** 0.176** 0.175** 
school (0.057) (0.065) (0.057) (0.080) (0.088) 
      
Observations 2,230 
0.062 
2,061 
0.265 
2,056 
0.500 
2,049 
0.308 
453.4 
1,675 
0.299 
327.9 
R-squared 
First-stage F   
 B. Math test scores 
Autonomous 1.003*** 0.877*** 0.505*** 0.320*** 0.311*** 
school (0.059) (0.068) (0.059) (0.076) (0.073) 
      
Observations 2,228 2,059 2,047 2,037 1,899 
R-squared 0.107 0.252 0.551 0.419 0.432 
First-stage F    694.9 625 
 C. English test scores 
Autonomous 0.969*** 0.839*** 0.527*** 0.331*** 0.346*** 
school (0.056) (0.063) (0.055) (0.066) (0.065) 
      
Observations 2,232 2,063 2,061 2,052 1,862 
R-squared 0.101 0.341 0.575 0.401 0.387 
First-stage F    699.7 625.6 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the middle school level are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). Student, family, and school characteristics include gender, disability, first-born child, number of siblings, 
single parent, parental age, parental education, parental employment status, parental income, high school gender 
composition (male-only, female-only, co-educational), high school establishment type (private, public), and 
dummies for middle schools from which the students graduated (i.e., middle school fixed effects). 
 
variables. When these characteristics are controlled, the estimated test score gap 
between the two groups is slightly reduced to about 0.69, 0.88, and 0.84 standard 
deviations in Korean, math, and English, respectively. These estimates are 
comparable to those reported in Kim and Namkung (2014) (0.6~0.7 and 0.7~1.0 
standard deviations in Korean and math, respectively), who mainly estimated the 
impact of autonomous schools on the academic achievement of students by 
regressing test scores on school types after controlling for student, family, and 
school characteristics. The estimation results in column (2), in conjunction with the 
results in column (1), also indicate that the student, family, and school 
characteristics can only account for approximately 10% of the observed test score 
gap between autonomous school students and non-autonomous school students. 
Exploiting the longitudinal structure of my data, in column (3) I include 
students’ pre-determined academic quality levels as measured by their ninth-grade 
(i.e., third year in middle school) test scores as controls added to the list of controls 
used in column (2). As discussed in the chapter II, only the top 50% of students in 
terms of their middle school grades could apply for entry into autonomous schools. 
Hence, students in autonomous schools are likely to perform better than their peers 
in non-autonomous schools even before they enter high schools. Adding lagged test 
scores as an additional control could control for this differences in the pre-
determined academic quality levels between the two groups. When the baseline test 
scores are further controlled, the estimated achievement gap between the two 
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groups is reduced substantially to about 0.39, 0.51, and 0.53 standard deviations in 
Korean, math, and English, respectively. These results suggest that Kim and 
Namkung (2014) likely overestimated the achievement effect of the autonomous 
schools by ignoring the differences in the pre-determined academic quality 
between the autonomous school students and the traditional non-autonomous 
school students. 
In columns (1) to (3), I estimated equation (1) with the OLS method using 
different sets of covariates. Econometrically, however, estimating equation (1) with 
OLS will result in an inconsistent estimate when the error term . . .10( )i m h th  is 
serially correlated with its lagged term . . .9( )i m h th  because equation (1) includes a 
lagged dependent variable . . .9( )i m h thY  as a regressor. To address this issue, I 
instrument the potentially endogenous ninth-grade test scores . . .9( )i m h thY with 
seventh-grade test scores . . .7( )i m h thY . This allows the error term . . .10( )i m h th  to 
follow a “mild” serial correlation (i.e., AR(1) or AR(2) process) but not a “severe” 
one (i.e., AR(p) process with p≥3). Column (4) of Table 1, which is my most 
preferred specification, shows the two-stage least-square (2SLS) estimation results 
using seventh-grade test scores . . .7( )i m h thY  as an instrument variable for ninth-grade 
test scores . . .7( )i m h thY . The impacts of attending an autonomous school on Korean, 
math, and English test scores are estimated to be 0.18, 0.32, and 0.33 standard 
deviations, respectively. Comparing these 2SLS estimates with the OLS estimates 
reported in column (3) reveals that the serial correlation issue discussed above is 
indeed serious. 
Table 2 shows that students in autonomous schools tend to spend more on 
private tutoring than their peers in traditional non-autonomous schools. To the 
extent that private tutoring may improve the academic achievement of students, as 
discussed in a number of recent studies (e.g., Kang, 2012; Ryu and Kang, 2013), 
the estimated autonomous school premium reported in column (4) of Table 3 could 
be spuriously driven by the differences in private tutoring investment. To check  
for this possibility, I add the amount of private tutoring expenditures for each 
subject as an additional control variable in column (5). Even after controlling for 
these non-school educational inputs, the estimated autonomous school premium 
remains similar, indicating that the estimates reported in column (4) are largely 
attributable to the type of high schools the students attend and not to differences in 
private tutoring expenditures. Finally, in Table 4, I repeat the above-mentioned 
analysis using eleventh-grade (i.e., second year in high school) test scores as an 
outcome variable. Specifically, I estimate equation (1) using . . .11i m h thY  as the left-
hand-side variable instead of . . .10i m h thY . The results are roughly similar to those 
reported in Table 3. In terms of my preferred specification (column 4), attending an 
autonomous school improve tenth-grade test scores by 0.18, 0.32, and 0.33 
standard deviations and eleventh-grade test scores by 0.24, 0.28, and 0.34 standard 
deviations in Korean, math, and English, respectively. 
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TABLE 4—ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR ELEVENTH-GRADE (SECOND YEAR IN HIGH SCHOOL) TEST SCORES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Covariates None Student, family, 
school 
characteristics 
(2) + 9th grade 
test scores 
Same as (3) (4) + private 
tutoring 
expenditures 
 A. Korean test scores 
Autonomous 0.700*** 0.655*** 0.413*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 
school (0.062) (0.070) (0.061) (0.075) (0.079) 
      
Observations 2,254 2,085 2,080 2,073 1,810 
R-squared 0.053 0.235 0.424 0.278 0.295 
First-stage F    464.5 409.3 
 B. Math test scores 
Autonomous 0.889*** 0.730*** 0.455*** 0.280*** 0.256*** 
school (0.076) (0.082) (0.076) (0.091) (0.091) 
      
Observations 2,253 2,085 2,072 2,061 1,877 
R-squared 0.084 0.186 0.373 0.239 0.252 
First-stage F    661.3 643 
 C. English test scores 
Autonomous 0.911*** 0.755*** 0.500*** 0.343*** 0.370*** 
school (0.066) (0.072) (0.066) (0.080) (0.086) 
      
Observations 2,251 2,082 2,080 2,070 1,875 
R-squared 0.088 0.279 0.452 0.315 0.317 
First-stage F    697.5 651.1 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the middle school level are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). Student, family, and school characteristics include gender, disability, first-born child, number of siblings, 
single parent, parental age, parental education, parental employment status, parental income, high school gender 
composition (male-only, female-only, co-educational), high school establishment type (private, public), and 
dummies for middle schools from which the students graduated (i.e., middle school fixed effects). 
 
 
D. Falsification Test 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show that students attending the autonomous schools outperform 
their peers attending non-autonomous schools after controlling for student, family 
and school characteristics (including middle school fixed effects), baseline 
academic performance, and private tutoring expenditures. However, whether the 
estimated achievement gap between the two groups of students reflects the causal 
effect of attending an autonomous school remains questionable. For example, it is 
still possible that the estimated achievement gap reflects unobservable differences 
in pre-determined academic quality levels between the two groups of students. 
In order to determine whether equation (1) correctly identifies the causal effect 
of attending an autonomous school, I perform the following falsification test. 
Specifically, I estimate the impact of attending an autonomous school on the pre-
determined academic performance of students. Specifically, I replace the outcome 
variable of equation (1) with eighth-grade test scores . . .8( )i m h thY . Given that the 
eighth-grade test scores were determined before the students entered high school, 
the autonomous school attendance of students cannot causally affect their eighth-
grade test scores. 
Table 5 shows the falsification test results. Columns (1) to (3) report positive and  
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TABLE 5—FALSIFICATION TEST RESULTS FOR PRE-DETERMINED EIGHTH-GRADE  
(SECOND YEAR IN MIDDLE SCHOOL) TEST SCORES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimation OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Covariates None Student, family, 
school 
characteristics 
(2) + 9th grade 
test scores 
Same as (3) (4) + private 
tutoring 
expenditures 
 A. Korean test scores 
      
Autonomous 0.504*** 0.482*** 0.210*** -0.050 -0.018 
school (0.054) (0.059) (0.053) (0.065) (0.075) 
      
Observations 2,279 2,109 2,104 2,097 1,444 
R-squared 0.028 0.259 0.486 0.144 0.165 
First-stage F    483.4 321.2 
 B. Math test scores 
Autonomous 0.753*** 0.603*** 0.269*** -0.028 -0.040 
school (0.057) (0.065) (0.055) (0.071) (0.075) 
      
Observations 2,279 2,109 2,096 2,085 1,905 
R-squared 0.062 0.248 0.519 0.201 0.189 
First-stage F    680.1 505.4 
 C. English test scores 
      
Autonomous 0.633*** 0.465*** 0.155*** -0.117* -0.121* 
school (0.054) (0.057) (0.050) (0.065) (0.066) 
      
Observations 2,279 2,109 2,107 2,097 1,893 
R-squared 0.046 0.305 0.567 0.222 0.218 
First-stage F    725.9 640.5 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the middle school level are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). Student, family, and school characteristics include gender, disability, first-born child, number of siblings, 
single parent, parental age, parental education, parental employment status, and parental income, high school 
gender composition (male-only, female-only, co-educational), high school establishment type (private, public), and 
dummies for the middle schools from which the students graduated (i.e., middle school fixed effects). 
 
statistically significant impacts of the autonomous high schools, indicating that the 
corresponding regression equations are likely to be misspecified. On the other 
hand, in columns (4) and (5), my preferred specifications, I do not find any 
statistically significant effect for Korean and math. These results suggest that the 
estimated achievement gaps in the Korean and math test scores reported in columns 
(4) and (5) of Tables 3 and 4 are not driven by model misspecifications but instead 
reflect the causal effects of attending an autonomous school. For English test 
scores, however, the estimates from the falsification test are marginally significant 
at the 10% level, suggesting that the estimation results for English test scores 
should be interpreted with caution. 
 
E. Subgroup Analysis 
 
As discussed in chapter II, autonomous schools can charge up to three times the 
tuition of traditional non-autonomous schools in exchange for receiving no 
governmental subsidies. This feature raises the serious public concern that the 
autonomous schools can only serve students from high-income families. In this  
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
VOL. 38 NO. 3        Autonomy, Incentives, and School Performance 13 
TABLE 6—ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF ATTENDING AN AUTONOMOUS SCHOOL BY INCOME LEVEL 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low-income High-income 
Outcome 
variable 
10th grade 
score 
11th grade 
score 
9th grade 
score 
(falsification) 
10th grade 
score 
11th grade 
score 
9th grade 
score 
(falsification) 
 A. Korean test scores 
Autonomous 0.107 0.250** -0.159 0.231** 0.264** 0.034 
school (0.158) (0.107) (0.131) (0.106) (0.112) (0.107) 
       
Observations 777 832 683 898 978 761 
R-squared 0.281 0.337 0.258 0.315 0.291 0.096 
First-stage F 135.9 192.8 102.8 209 209 199 
       
 B. Math test scores 
Autonomous 0.410*** 0.285** -0.001 0.227** 0.221* -0.027 
school (0.099) (0.138) (0.123) (0.095) (0.120) (0.089) 
       
Observations 869 858 865 1,030 1,019 1,040 
R-squared 0.457 0.241 0.157 0.410 0.248 0.222 
First-stage F 274.7 278.4 242.3 364.7 303.9 331.5 
 C. English test scores 
Autonomous 0.282*** 0.521*** -0.058 0.378*** 0.281** -0.181* 
school (0.097) (0.114) (0.081) (0.088) (0.112) (0.095) 
       
Observations 854 861 863 1,008 1,014 1,030 
R-squared 0.436 0.419 0.345 0.345 0.249 0.071 
First-stage F 332.5 481.4 382.4 252.9 259.3 265.7 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the middle school level are in parentheses (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1). Student, family, and school characteristics of gender, disability, first-born child, number of siblings, single 
parent, parental age, parental education, parental employment status, parental income, high school gender 
composition (male-only, female-only, co-educational), high school establishment type (private, public), and 
dummies for middle schools from which the students graduated (i.e., middle school fixed effects), with the amount 
of private tutoring expenditures controlled. The low-income group refers to students whose parental monthly 
income is below KRW 4,500,000. The high-income group refers to those whose parental monthly income is 
greater than or equal to KRW 4,500,000. 
 
respect, it would be worthwhile to determine how the observed autonomous school 
premium varies across students' family backgrounds. 
To address this issue, I divide the estimation sample into the two subgroups of a 
high-income sample and a low-income sample. The high-income sample consists 
of students whose parental income in 2012, when the students were enrolled in the 
ninth grade, or their third year of middle school, is greater than or equal to or the 
median (KRW 4,500,000). Accordingly, the low-income sample consists of 
students whose parental income in the ninth grade is below the median. For each 
subgroup, I estimate the value-added model of equation (1) using the 2SLS method 
after controlling for the amount of private tutoring expenditures. This specification 
is comparable to the regression model used for column (5) of Tables 3, 4, and 5. 
Table 6 summarizes the estimation results. Overall, I do not find any clear 
evidence that the autonomous school premium varies according to students' family 
backgrounds. These results suggest that the benefits that accrue from school 
autonomy and incentives can be enjoyed by all students regardless of their family 
background. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of attending an autonomous private 
high school on the academic achievement of students. The autonomous private 
high school policy has been one of the most controversial educational policy issues 
in recent years. The 2014 local educational superintendent election sparked much 
heated debate about whether or not to abolish autonomous schools. The conflicts 
were followed by a series of lawsuits involving parents, autonomous schools, local 
offices of education, and the central government (i.e., the Ministry of Education). 
In spite of these serious conflicts, however, surprisingly little is known about how 
these autonomous schools affect students. Applying the value-added model by 
Todd and Wolpin (2007) to the longitudinal data at the student level, I find that 
autonomous schools more effectively improve the academic achievement of 
students by approximately 0.2 ~ 0.3 standard deviations relative to traditional non-
autonomous high schools. A key feature of the autonomous schools is that they can 
operate free from governmental control but at the cost of foregoing financial 
subsidies from the government. Because autonomous schools do not receive 
governmental subsidies, they have a strong financial incentive to improve the 
quality of their education, as schools failing to do so will lose pupils and will likely 
close as a result. In this respect, the estimated autonomous school premium 
suggests that providing schools with adequate autonomy and incentives can induce 
them to become more productive. 
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